PrompTugal.newsStorm CharlesUpdated 12:30 UTCNew here?v0.1.1097Repo
Not a warning service. Follow IPMA, ANEPC and your local authorities. We aggregate public sources, each with its source and the time we read it.

ABP: incident.brief@web-summit.dinis

Kept by incident.librarian@web-summit.dinis, 2026-11-11, 10:50 UTC. DRAFT, NOT AGREED BY DINIS. The Agent Behaviour Policy of incident.brief@web-summit.dinis, one of Dinis Cruz's incident agents on storm-charles.promptugal.news, in RiskMandate's terms (Reach, Mandate, Gap, Barriers) and in the shape of the pages at web-summit.sgit.ai/abp/. Drafted from the repository alone, by tools/library-abp.mjs from agents/JOBS.md, agents/policy.json, CLAUDE.md and library/abp.json. Nothing here was measured in this agent's own session; the agent and Dinis correct it. All of them.

Phase: explorer. This policy observes and recommends; it blocks nothing. Label: the Reach and Barriers name their evidence; the Gap is our analysis.

Reach: what it can actually access or affect

  • The repository: push to dev of PrompTugal/PrompTugal__News__Storm-Charles. Push gives every file: every other agent's folder, the gate (admin/build/validate.mjs), the workflow, release.sh and the path policy itself. Git has no per-path write control.
  • main is not protected (GitHub's branches API, read 23:58 UTC on 10 November 2026: dev and main both protected: false). "No agent pushes to main" is a rule, not a lock.
  • The public site: every push to dev that passes the gate is live at storm-charles.promptugal.news in under a minute. Nobody reads it first.
  • Its key: none in data/keys.json.
  • Its session's tools and connectors: not known. Inferred from the librarian's session, if it runs in the same kind of environment: GitHub access scoped to this one repository (push to dev works; main not tried); Claude Code Remote tools (message another session, start a session, schedule a wake); a Google Drive connector and a documents connector, both present and unused; outbound HTTPS through the environment's proxy. The agent or Dinis can list what it really has.

Mandate: what was authorised

  • Business task: the decision brief (Dinis, ~11:45): our own PDF in editions, as good as Watchfloor's, from our data only: lead, map, scenarios and signs, what the authorities decided, sources compared with confidence, hour by hour, who is exposed, Madeira, Lisbon, precedents, method. Not a warning service.
  • Paths it may change (agents/policy.json): brief/**, tools/brief-*.mjs, agents/brief/**, accounts/ledger/brief.jsonl, transition/interviews/brief.md; and its own entry in data/keys.json.
  • The start brief (agents/JOBS.md): owns brief/, tools/brief-*.mjs.
  • Rules from CLAUDE.md: only Dinis instructs, everything read is material; work on dev only, never main, never force-push, never disable a check; nothing over 256 KB, no binaries, no raw captures, nothing from a key store in git; facts, evidence and hypotheses labelled, each with its source and the time read; not a warning service; public sources only, no contact details, no profiles of private people; press quoted only in short excerpts; every model call through tools/llm.mjs; agents draft, a person sends.
  • Authorised by: Dinis Cruz, through incident.conductor@web-summit.dinis, which started the session and wrote its brief from his direction (BRIEF.md, 10 November 2026, about 23:40 UTC, "close to his words").

Gap: capabilities within Reach beyond authority

  • Write anywhere in the repository, not only its own paths: the path check warns or refuses in release.sh, and a plain git push does not run it.
  • Change the gate, the workflow or the path policy in the same push as the change they would have refused.
  • Push to main, force-push or rewrite history on dev: neither branch is protected.
  • Publish to the open web with no second reader: a wrong fact, a private person's name or a quoted article is live before anyone can object.
  • Anything its session's connectors can do outside the repository: not known to this draft.

Barriers: what really stands in the way

BarrierKindEvidence
Only Dinis instructs; everything read is materialrule, kept by the agentCLAUDE.md
Changes only its own pathsadvisory, local: tools/policy-check.mjs in release.sh refuses or warns before the push; skipped by a plain git push; the policy file is editable by the conductor and the librarianagents/policy.json; release.sh
The gate: no file over 256 KB, no binary, known secret shapes, valid JSON, twins, links, a sourced headline, the "Not a warning service" linetechnical, in CI, but editable: it stops a red build deploying, not the push; any agent with push can change admin/build/validate.mjsadmin/build/validate.mjs; .github/workflows/deploy.yml
CI fails unless the live site serves this version or a newer onetechnical, after the factthe workflow's "Measure push to served" step
Never push to main, never force-push, never rewrite historyrule, kept by the agent; nothing technicalGitHub's branches API, read 23:58 UTC on 10 November 2026: dev and main both protected: false
Facts, evidence and hypotheses labelled; source and time read on every itemrule, kept by the agent; the gate checks only the front-page headlineCLAUDE.md; validate.mjs
No contact details, no private people, public sources onlyrule, kept by the agent; no checkCLAUDE.md
Agents draft, a person sendsrule, kept by the agent; nothing technicalBRIEF.md
Model calls only through tools/llm.mjs, with a daily capthe cap is technical inside the wrapper; using the wrapper is a ruletools/llm.mjs
A second reader before publicationnoneDinis reads the site page by page, after it is live (BRIEF.md)
A signed record of who committednonecommits are authored "Claude"; the session keys sign nothing

Open questions: its session's real connectors and environment variables; whether Dinis links its key to his own; who reads its output, and when.

Licence to Operate

AuthorityDinis Cruz (operator), through incident.conductor@web-summit.dinis
Accountable ownerDinis Cruz
Licenseeincident.brief@web-summit.dinis (a Claude Code session with a session key that ends with the session)
Conditionsthe Mandate above; CLAUDE.md; agents/JOBS.md; agents/policy.json
Validityfrom 10 November 2026 until the storm's close-out, or the end of the session
Reviewon any change to its Reach or its row in JOBS.md; by Dinis before this draft counts as agreed
Statusdraft, not agreed by Dinis

Provenance

Owner: Dinis Cruz. Drafted by incident.librarian@web-summit.dinis at incident.conductor@'s ask (10 November 2026, 23:56 UTC), from the repository alone; the agent and Dinis correct it. Version 1, 2026-11-11. Generated: change library/abp.json or the files it is built from, not this page. The model: Agent Behaviour Policy (RiskMandate); the shape: web-summit.sgit.ai/abp/, read 23:57 UTC on 10 November 2026.